Methodology
Long-Run Event Studies
A long-run event study measures the price effect of a corporate event over a horizon of roughly 12 to 60 months rather than a few days around the announcement. Stretching the window that far changes the statistics completely: the short-window toolkit that works over three or five days becomes badly misspecified over three or five years, so long-run work needs its own estimators and its own tests. This page covers why short-window inference breaks, the three estimators that compete to replace it, the biases each carries, how to test them, and the open methodological debate over which to trust.
Long horizons break the assumptions behind short-window inference in three ways: a small benchmark error compounds into a large gap (the bad-model problem), compounded returns turn strongly right-skewed so the normal t is misspecified, and long windows for different firms overlap in calendar time so their abnormal returns are cross-correlated and standard errors are too small. Three estimators compete to measure the effect: cumulative abnormal return (CAR), buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR), and the calendar-time portfolio alpha. BHAR is the most intuitive but overstates significance, calendar-time is more conservative and better specified but lower-powered. The defensible practice is to report both and trust only a result that survives both.
Why short-window methods break over the long run
Short-window inference rests on assumptions that hold comfortably over a few days and dissolve over one to five years. An abnormal return is a residual: the realized return minus the return predicted by an expected-return model. Over a handful of days the market barely moves, so any sensible benchmark gives nearly the same normal return and model error is a rounding error. Over 36 or 60 months the picture inverts. Three problems, below, each grow with the horizon, and together they explain why a naive long-run t-test rejects a true null far too often.
Bad-model problem. Every abnormal return is realized minus modeled, so a test of "did the event matter?" is inseparable from "is my expected-return model right?" Over days, benchmark error is negligible. Over 36 to 60 months, a small per-period pricing error (say a mis-estimated size or value premium) compounds mechanically into a large cumulative gap. Fama (1998) states it plainly: all expected-return models are incomplete, and the bad-model problem is far more serious at long horizons than at short ones. See expected-return models.
Skewness of compounded returns. Buy-and-hold returns compound. A stock is bounded below at minus 100% but unbounded above, so the cross-sectional distribution of multi-year returns is strongly right-skewed. The sample mean of a skewed variable is a biased proxy for the population mean in finite samples, and the conventional t-statistic, built on a symmetric-normal assumption, is misspecified. Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) trace much of the failure of long-run test statistics to exactly this positive skew.
Cross-correlation of overlapping windows. Long windows for different firms overlap in calendar time. When many firms are "in window" during the same months (merger waves, IPO hot markets, industry clustering), their abnormal returns share common calendar shocks and are positively cross-correlated. Standard errors that assume independent event-firm observations are then far too small and t-statistics are inflated. Mitchell and Stafford (2000) show this positive cross-correlation is a leading, commonly-ignored reason naive BHAR tests over-reject.
The combined effect is not subtle. Kothari and Warner (1997) find that long-horizon parametric test statistics are severely misspecified, with rejection frequencies for a true null sometimes exceeding 30% at a nominal 5% level, five to ten times the intended size. A long-run study that reports a significant abnormal return using short-window machinery has, on this evidence, a good chance of reporting noise.
The three estimators
Three estimators compete to summarize long-run performance. They differ in how they aggregate monthly abnormal returns (additively, by compounding, or by re-aligning firms into calendar time), and those choices drive their biases. Each block below gives the estimator, its formula, and what it actually measures.
CAR, cumulative abnormal return
The monthly abnormal return is \( AR_{it} = R_{it} - E[R_{it}] \), where the benchmark \( E[R_{it}] \) is a reference portfolio or matched control return. The cumulative abnormal return over event months \( \tau_1 \) to \( \tau_2 \) is the arithmetic sum:
\[ CAR_{i}(\tau_1,\tau_2) = \sum_{t=\tau_1}^{\tau_2} AR_{it} \]
Measures: an additive, implicitly monthly-rebalanced abnormal return. Benchmark: reference portfolio or matched control. Less skewed than BHAR and better behaved statistically, but it does not represent the return to a realistic buy-and-hold investor.
BHAR, buy-and-hold abnormal return
BHAR compounds the event firm's return and subtracts the compounded return of a matched benchmark:
\[ BHAR_{i}(\tau_1,\tau_2) = \prod_{t=\tau_1}^{\tau_2}\bigl(1+R_{it}\bigr) - \prod_{t=\tau_1}^{\tau_2}\bigl(1+E[R_{it}]\bigr) \]
Measures: what an investor would have earned holding the event firm instead of an otherwise-similar firm. Benchmark: a single matched control firm, per Barber and Lyon (1997), matched on size (market cap between 70% and 130% of the event firm) then, among those, the closest book-to-market. Matching this way removes the new-listing, rebalancing, and skewness biases that contaminate reference-portfolio BHARs. Economically the most intuitive estimator, but the most skewed and the most exposed to cross-correlation.
Calendar-time alpha (Jensen's alpha)
Instead of aligning returns in event time, align them in calendar time. In each calendar month, form a portfolio of every firm that experienced the event within the prior holding horizon, compute the portfolio excess return \( R_{pt} - R_{ft} \), and run one time-series regression on a factor model, for example Fama-French three-factor:
\[ R_{pt} - R_{ft} = \alpha_p + \beta_p\,(R_{mt}-R_{ft}) + s_p\,SMB_t + h_p\,HML_t + \varepsilon_{pt} \]
Measures: the average monthly abnormal return, read directly off the intercept \( \alpha_p \). Benchmark: the factor model itself. Because every month is a single portfolio observation, cross-sectional correlation among event firms is absorbed into the portfolio variance automatically, so the alpha standard error is free of the cross-firm dependence that breaks event-time tests. It is not automatically free of time-series problems (the firm count varies month to month, so residual variance is heteroskedastic), which is why the calendar-time alpha still needs White or WLS standard errors, covered in the testing section below. Fama (1998) calls this the preferred method: forming portfolios in calendar time handles the cross-correlation of event-firm returns without estimating any covariances.
Bias tradeoffs
The three estimators are not interchangeable. They answer slightly different questions and carry different biases, so the choice is a genuine tradeoff between economic intuition and statistical reliability.
| Estimator | What it measures | Main bias | Statistical behavior |
|---|---|---|---|
| CAR (sum of AR) | Additive, monthly-rebalanced abnormal return | Does not match a real buy-and-hold, still carries some skew | Better specified than BHAR, moderate power |
| BHAR (compounded, matched control firm) | Buy-and-hold gap versus a size and book-to-market twin | Strong positive skew, positive cross-correlation of overlapping windows overstates significance | Most likely to over-reject a true null (Type I error) |
| Calendar-time / Jensen alpha | Average monthly abnormal return of a live portfolio | Low power when event firms are few or clustered, sensitive to equal versus value weighting | More conservative, better specified, correct standard errors |
The asymmetry is the whole story. BHAR overstates significance because it ignores the cross-sectional dependence of overlapping event windows, so it over-rejects the null. Calendar-time alpha is more conservative and better specified because it absorbs that dependence into the portfolio variance, at the cost of lower power. Neither is uniformly correct: a large BHAR t-stat can be an artifact of clustering, and a null calendar-time alpha can be low power rather than genuine efficiency.
How to test each
Each estimator needs a test matched to its distribution. Using a plain normal t on any of them, and especially on BHAR, is the mistake that produces the 30% rejection rates above.
BHAR: skewness-adjusted t, then bootstrap
Because BHARs are right-skewed, the ordinary t is biased. Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) use the Johnson (1978) skewness-adjusted statistic. With mean \( \overline{BHAR} \), cross-sectional standard deviation \( \sigma \), sample size \( n \), estimated skewness \( \hat\gamma \), and \( S = \overline{BHAR}/\sigma \):
\[ t_{sa} = \sqrt{n}\left( S + \tfrac{1}{3}\hat\gamma\,S^{2} + \tfrac{1}{6n}\hat\gamma \right) \]
where gamma_hat = ( (1/n) * sum_i (BHAR_i - mean_BHAR)^3 ) / sigma^3
step 1: compute t_sa on the observed sample
step 2: bootstrap. draw many resamples, recompute t_sa in each,
build the empirical distribution of t_sa
step 3: compare the observed t_sa to bootstrapped critical values,
not to normal critical values
Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) show the skewness adjustment alone still over-rejects, so the bootstrapped distribution of \( t_{sa} \) is the version that survives their simulations in random samples.
Calendar-time alpha: robust or WLS standard errors. The number of firms in the portfolio changes month to month, so residual variance is heteroskedastic (fewer firms means noisier months). Two standard fixes: use White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors on the OLS alpha, or run weighted least squares weighting each month by the number of firms in the portfolio that month, as recommended by Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999). Both deliver a correctly sized t on the monthly alpha.
CAR: standard cross-sectional or time-series t. CAR inference uses the conventional t on the mean CAR. Its lower skewness makes that t less badly behaved than for BHAR, but it still shares the cross-correlation problem when windows overlap. See significance tests for the full menu of parametric and nonparametric options.
The reliability debate
This is an unsettled methodological argument, not a settled recipe. The estimate you report depends on the method you pick, and the leading papers openly disagree about which method to trust and what a null result even means. A reader should leave this page knowing that a single long-run number, stated without its method, is close to uninterpretable.
Barber and Lyon (1997). Reference-portfolio BHARs are misspecified. Match each event firm to a single control firm on size and book-to-market to remove new-listing, rebalancing, and skewness biases.
Kothari and Warner (1997). Long-horizon parametric tests are severely misspecified, rejecting a true null far too often (over 30% at 5%). Use nonparametric and bootstrap tests.
Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999). Both a carefully built BHAR test and calendar-time work in random samples, but misspecification returns in clustered samples. Their verdict: analysis of long-run abnormal returns is treacherous.
Fama (1998). Most long-run anomalies shrink or vanish under sensible methods. The calendar-time portfolio is preferred because it handles cross-correlation naturally, without estimating covariances.
Mitchell and Stafford (2000). The independence assumption behind BHAR is false, overlapping returns are positively cross-correlated. Correct for it and long-run abnormal performance around acquisitions, issues, and repurchases largely shrinks away.
Loughran and Ritter (2000). The counter: value-weighted calendar-time regressions are "uniformly least powerful", they down-weight the small firms where anomalies live, so a null there is weak evidence, not strong evidence of efficiency.
Report both: BHAR with matched control firms and a bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t, and calendar-time alpha with robust or WLS standard errors. Trust a result only if it survives both estimators, and always disclose the weighting scheme, because equal-weighting and value-weighting can flip the conclusion. Acquirers and equity issuers are the canonical long-run samples, see mergers and acquisitions and investment strategies, and both are exactly the clustered, overlapping-window settings where this debate bites hardest.
Long-run event studies sit alongside the short-window and other event-study designs covered elsewhere on this site. For where they fit in the wider taxonomy, see other event-study types, the model choices behind every abnormal return in expected-return models, the full test menu in significance tests, and the overall methodology overview.
References
| Barber, B. M., & Lyon, J. D. (1997). Detecting long-run abnormal stock returns: The empirical power and specification of test statistics. Journal of Financial Economics, 43(3), 341-372. RePEc/IDEAS |
| Kothari, S. P., & Warner, J. B. (1997). Measuring long-horizon security price performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 43(3), 301-339. RePEc/IDEAS |
| Lyon, J. D., Barber, B. M., & Tsai, C.-L. (1999). Improved methods for tests of long-run abnormal stock returns. Journal of Finance, 54(1), 165-201. Wiley |
| Fama, E. F. (1998). Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance. Journal of Financial Economics, 49(3), 283-306. RePEc/IDEAS |
| Mitchell, M. L., & Stafford, E. (2000). Managerial decisions and long-term stock price performance. Journal of Business, 73(3), 287-329. RePEc/IDEAS |
| Loughran, T., & Ritter, J. R. (2000). Uniformly least powerful tests of market efficiency. Journal of Financial Economics, 55(3), 361-389. RePEc/EconPapers |
| Johnson, N. J. (1978). Modified t tests and confidence intervals for asymmetrical populations. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 73(363), 536-544. |
| Fama, E. F., Fisher, L., Jensen, M. C., & Roll, R. (1969). The adjustment of stock prices to new information. International Economic Review, 10(1), 1-21. |